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I. INTRODUCTION 
Minnesota’s Civil Damages Act is a creature of statute without 
counterpart in common law.1  The Act, referred to as the “Dram Shop 
Act,” is highly penal in nature and is intended to provide remedies for 
damages attributable to commercial lenders’ illegal sale of intoxicating 
liquors.2  Since the Act’s inception more than ninety-two years ago, 
Minnesota courts traditionally have construed it in a strict fashion.  Over 
its long evolution, the “duet” of legislative action and court interpretation 
served to clarify several ambiguities within the Act.  Despite precise and 
oftentimes circumstantial application, certain ambiguities remain.  The 
following article will—in the context of recent Minnesota Dram Shop 
decisions—analyze the ambiguities in Dram Shop law and recommend 
clarifications in these areas. 
II. ELEMENTS OF PROOF 
To establish a claim under Minnesota’s Dram Shop Act, a plaintiff 
must prove the following five elements:3 
1. An illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, including 3.2 beer or 
“strong” beer; 
 
 1. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 subd. 1 (2002); Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395, 
403 (Minn. 1977) (holding that because the legislature has provided a remedy for the 
illegal sale of intoxicating liquor in the Civil Damages Act, the legislature has preempted 
the field and has provided the exclusive remedy in the act).  A common-law cause of 
action for negligence will be allowed only where the act does not apply.  Id. 
 2.  See Vill. of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284, 301 (8th Cir. 1961) 
(stating that “[t]he statute was intended to provide remedies unknown to the common law 
for certain losses attributable to illegal acts in connection with the dispensation of 
intoxicating liquor and the Legislature was content, as a matter of its measure of social 
justice, to place upon those who benefit by that trade the burden occasioned by these 
illegalities”); see also Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Minn. 1982) (holding 
that the definition in the Civil Damages Act that “ ‘any person’ who sells or barters liquor 
means a person in the business of providing liquor, and not a social host who happens to 
receive some consideration from his guests in return for drinks he provides”).  The statute 
has been expanded in recent years to provide limited social host liability against persons 
21 or older who provide alcohol to a person younger than 21.  See MINN. STAT. § 
340A.90 (2002) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 1, 2000, ch. 423, § 1, 2000 Minn. 
Laws 884). 
 3. MINN. STAT. § 340A.802 (2002).  See Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose, 253 
Minn. 347, 356, 91 N.W.2d 794, 801 (Minn. 1958) (holding that “[i]t is elementary that 
before plaintiffs are entitled to recover in these cases they must show by competent proof 
that defendants . . . unlawfully furnished intoxicating liquor . . . which caused or 
contributed to . . . intoxication and that the same was a proximate cause of the 
injuries . . . .”). 
2
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2. The illegal sale caused or contributed to the alleged 
intoxicated person’s (AIP’s) condition; 
3. Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the AIP’s intoxication; 
4. Plaintiff sustained damages recoverable under the Act; and 
5. Defendant received written notice of plaintiff’s intent to 
make a claim for damages within 240 days of the date plaintiff 
entered into an attorney-client relationship regarding the 
claim.4 
A.  Illegal Sales 
The Civil Damages Act expressly imposes Dram Shop liability for 
“illegally selling” alcoholic beverages.5  It applies to the “sale” of any 
alcoholic beverage with at least one-half of 1 percent alcohol by 
volume.6  The Act itself does not define what is illegal, but Minnesota 
courts developed a focused analysis to determine whether a particular 
liquor sale imposes Dram Shop liability.  The court reviews: (1) whether 
the sale was in violation of a provision of Chapter 340A, and if so (2) 
whether the violation was substantially related to the purposes sought to 
be achieved by the Civil Damages Act.  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
observed that this analysis furthers the legislature’s intent to curtail 
illegal sales impacting “the public’s access to and consumption of 
alcoholic beverages.”7 
The appellate courts’ interpretation of the Act has resulted in a 
lengthy list of sales considered illegal for purposes of a Dram Shop 
action.  Statutory violations that may give rise to a liquor liability claim 
include: (1) sales to obviously intoxicated persons,8 (2) sales to minors,9 
and (3) miscellaneous others including (a) sales after hours,10 (b) sales on 
 
 4. MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 2 (2002).  In the case of claims for contribution 
or indemnity, the notice must be served within 120 days after the injury occurs or within 
sixty days after receiving written notice of a claim for contribution or indemnity, 
whichever is applicable.  Id. 
 5. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (2002). 
 6. MINN. STAT. § 340A.101, subd. 2 (2002). 
 7. Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 21-22 (Minn. 1989). 
 8. MINN. STAT. § 340A.502 (2002). 
 9. MINN. STAT. § 340A.503 (2002). Any sale or furnishment of alcohol to a minor 
constitutes an “illegal act” under the dram shop statute. In actions involving minors, the 
plaintiff need not prove that the minor was intoxicated when the sale was made because 
the sale itself is illegal. 
 10. MINN. STAT. § 340A.504 (2002). A liquor vendor selling intoxicating liquor 
after hours is “illegally selling” intoxicating liquor.  See Hollerich v. Good Thunder, 340 
N.W.2d 665, 668 (Minn. 1983) (holding that “the prohibition against after-hour sales is 
3
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prohibited days,11 (c) sales at prohibited locations,12 (d) sales to 
nonmembers of a private club,13 and (e) sales by vendors of “on sale” 
liquor license to patrons that the vendor knows or should know will 
consume alcoholic beverages off premises.14 
Although the legacy of Dram Shop jurisprudence has effectively 
identified particular violations, the level of evidentiary proof to establish 
an illegal sale has not been well defined in all categories of illegal sales.  
In 2002, Minnesota Dram Shop decisions focused on sales to “obviously 
intoxicated” persons. 
1.  Sales to “obviously intoxicated” persons (Minn. Stat. § 
340A.502) 
“No person may sell, give, furnish, or in any way procure for 
another alcoholic beverages for the use of an obviously intoxicated 
person.”15  This statutory prohibition applies only if intoxication is 
“observable in appearance or behavior of the person to whom the 
intoxicating liquor is furnished.”16  In Strand v. Village of Watson,17 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the following definition of “obvious 
intoxication”: “[T]here must be such outward manifestation of 
intoxication that a person using his reasonable powers of observation can 
see or should see that such person has become intoxicated.”18 
In other words, a finding of obvious intoxication does not require 
proof of any specified amount of drinking or any degree of intoxication, 
but requires proof the AIP has “lost control to any extent of his mental or 
physical faculties and that such condition is, or should be, observable or 
apparent to the seller” at the time of the alleged illegal sale.19  Common 
 
sufficiently related to the purposes of the Dramshop Act so that such sales by a vendor 
constitute ‘illegally selling’ within the meaning of the Act”). 
 11. MINN. STAT. § 340A.504. The sale of alcohol is prohibited on certain days and 
at certain times.  A sale on a prohibited day is analogous to a sale after hours and is an 
“illegal sale” per se. 
 12. MINN. STAT. § 340A.412, subd. 4 (2002) (prohibiting the sale of intoxicating 
liquors in specified locations). 
 13. MINN. STAT. § 340A.404, subd. 1(4) (2002) (allowing some municipalities to 
issue “on-sale” licenses to clubs).  These licenses permit sales to members and bona fide 
guests only.  Id.  Therefore, a sale to a non-member or bona fide guest is illegal. 
 14. MINN. STAT. § 340A.101, subd. 21 (2002) (limiting consumption of alcoholic 
beverages sold under an on-sale liquor license to the licensed premises only). 
 15. MINN. STAT. § 340A.502 (2002). 
 16. Mjos v. Howard Lake, 287 Minn. 427, 432, 178 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn. 1970). 
 17. 245 Minn. 414, 72 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1955). 
 18. Id. at 422, 72 N.W.2d at 615. 
 19. Murphy v. Hennen, 264 Minn. 457, 463, 119 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Minn. 1963). 
4
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indices of obvious intoxication include: slurred speech, unsteady gait, 
unusually loud or boisterous speech, and bloodshot eyes. 
A blood test or urinalysis is evidence in an “obvious intoxication” 
case but does not conclusively establish obvious intoxication.20  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has confirmed a high blood-alcohol reading—
via blood test or urinalysis test—does not, as a matter of law, establish 
obvious intoxication.21 “Obvious intoxication” is an issue to be decided 
by the fact finder.  No particular evidence is given more or less weight as 
a matter of law, but all evidence is left for the jury or judge to balance. 
In the unpublished case of Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Makitalo, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed a jury instruction regarding the 
definition of “obviously intoxicated.”22  In Stevens, plaintiffs argued they 
were entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) because 
the evidence demonstrated Makitalo exhibited signs of obvious 
intoxication when served by the Eagle’s Nest Resort bartender.23 
Plaintiffs also contended the district court erroneously instructed the jury 
regarding the definition of “obviously intoxicated.”24  The disputed jury 
instruction included the following sentence: “A person is not obviously 
intoxicated within the meaning of the Dram Shop statute simply by 
virtue of having reached a certain blood alcohol content level.”25 
In upholding the district court’s judgment and instruction, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals held, “[C]ontrary to appellants’ assertion, 
this instruction did not advise the jury that blood alcohol content could 
not be considered as circumstantial evidence of a person’s 
intoxication.”26  The Stevens court observed, “[T]he Minnesota Supreme 
Court has stated that a high blood alcohol reading alone is not sufficient 
 
 20. See Strand, 245 Minn. at 422-23, 72 N.W.2d at 615-16 (holding that 
“[c]ircumstantial evidence may help to establish the essential fact [‘obvious’ or ‘visible’ 
intoxication], but there must be evidence from which it reasonably may be inferred that 
the essential fact [‘obvious’ or ‘visible’ intoxication] did exist”). 
 21. See Seeley v. Sobczak, 281 N.W.2d 368, 370-71 (Minn. 1979) (holding that it 
was improper to presume that a certain blood-alcohol content establishes “obvious 
intoxication” as a matter of law, where the alleged intoxicated person possessed a blood-
alcohol content of 0.269 percent). 
 22. No. C7-01-1791, 2002 WL 1315827 (Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 2002).  
Unpublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential, not controlling, and 
often are treated as having limited value.  See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (1998).   
However, unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.  Id. 
 23. Id. at *1. 
 24. Id. at *1-2. 
 25. Id. at *2. 
 26. Id. 
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as a matter of law to establish obvious intoxication.”27 
As an unpublished case, Stevens has no precedential effect and 
should not be cited for legal propositions.  However, the case reveals the 
Minnesota appellate courts’ general deference to the finder of fact where 
“obvious intoxication” is at issue. Therefore, a jury or judge may find 
that someone was “obviously intoxicated” by virtue of any relevant 
evidence, such as testimony from a toxicologist or eyewitness testimony 
regarding the physical and mental state of the AIP.  As long as the fact 
finder does not conclude “obvious intoxication” solely on the basis of the 
AIP’s reported blood-alcohol content and absent some other 
circumstantial or direct evidence, the decision of that fact finder will 
stand. 
While blood-alcohol content alone does not translate into “obvious 
intoxication” as a matter of law, the recent, unpublished case of DeSanti 
v. Youngs indicates an illegal sale to an “obviously intoxicated” person 
can be found solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence.28  More 
precisely, the DeSanti court, in the absence of direct testimony or 
evidence establishing an illegal sale, permitted the jury to infer an illegal 
sale occurred based on circumstantial evidence (toxicological testimony 
based on blood alcohol content, consumption history, and AIP’s 
testimony regarding his behavior and level of intoxication). 
In DeSanti, appellee Youngs arrived at appellants’ bar (The Barn) at 
approximately 12:30 p.m. on August 1, 1999 for “customer appreciation 
day.”29  The Barn’s liquor license allows only the sale of 3.2 beer, but 
The Barn allows patrons to bring their own hard alcohol to mix with soda 
and other “set-ups.”30  Youngs brought with him a 750-milliliter bottle of 
Black Velvet whiskey.31  “At trial, Youngs testified that he had eight to 
ten drinks from the bottle of Black Velvet . . . .”32  The bartender 
testified that around 6:00 p.m. she saw Youngs with a half full bottle of 
whiskey.33  “Young’s last recollection at The Barn is playing 
horseshoes . . . .”34  Youngs testified that at this point “he ‘wasn’t doing 
very good with the horseshoes,’ and the he was ‘landing short, being way 
 
 27. Id. (citing Seeley v. Sobczak, 281 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1979)). 
 28. No. C8-02-1311, 2003 WL 139393 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003). 
 29. Id. at *1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
6
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off.’ ”35  Youngs, apparently feeling that good luck from holding 
horseshoes all afternoon would allow him to drive home safely, left The 
Barn in his vehicle at approximately 7:00 p.m., then struck Victoria 
DeSanti as she rode her bicycle on County Road 18.36  “Youngs was 
arrested, and his blood alcohol content (BAC) measured .32 [percent].”37  
At trial plaintiff’s toxicologist testified that “once Youngs’ BAC reached 
.20 [percent], signs of intoxication would have been evident.”38 
The Youngs court confirmed the standard for obvious intoxication 
is whether a person could reasonably see that the buyer was 
intoxicated.39  Despite arguments from The Barn that the circumstantial 
evidence offered cannot alone sustain a “reasonable inference that an 
illegal sale occurred,”40 the Desanti court held that “circumstantial 
evidence supports a reasonable inference that The Barn sold Youngs 
alcohol while he was obviously intoxicated . . . .”41  The court based this 
conclusion on “(1) the testimony about Youngs’ deterioration in motor 
skills while at The Barn, (2) the evidence of Young’s BAC when he was 
arrested, and (3) the toxicologist’s testimony regarding the level of BAC 
at which Youngs would have shown signs of intoxication.”42 
Evaluating the verdict in light of the lack of direct evidence that 
Youngs purchased beer from The Barn,43 the DeSanti court explained, 
“Where circumstantial evidence reasonably permits different inferences, 
the choice of the inference to be drawn rests with the factfinder.”44  
Specifically, “along with the evidence that he drank one-half of the bottle 
of whiskey, we must consider how Youngs’ BAC reached .32 
[percent].”45  The toxicologist “testified that 12 to 14 beers would 
contain the same amount of alcohol as one-half of the bottle of whiskey, 
and that consuming both would have brought Youngs’s BAC to at least 
.32 [percent].”46  The court stated, “The jury could infer from this 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at *2. 
 38. Id. at *4. 
 39. Id. at *5 (citing Jewett v. Deutsch, 437 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989)). 
 40. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311 at *5. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at *6. 
 43. Id. at *7. 
 44. Id. (citing Fogarty v. Martin Hotel Co., 257 Minn. 398, 403, 101 N.W.2d 601, 
605 (Minn. 1960)). 
 45. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311 at *7. 
 46. Id. 
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testimony that one-half of the bottle of whiskey would not be sufficient 
to bring Youngs’ BAC to .32 [percent].”47  The court found that “[f]rom 
the evidence presented, beer sold at The Barn was the only alternative 
alcohol source available to Youngs.”48 
The court recognized that “no single person’s testimony presents 
direct evidence of an illegal sale.”49  Nevertheless, the court concluded 
that all of the circumstantial evidence viewed together in a light most 
favorable to the verdict permitted a reasonable inference that Youngs 
was obviously intoxicated.50 
In DeSanti, the court of appeals demonstrated deference to the 
jury’s decision regarding “obvious intoxication,” allowing the fact finder 
to make any “reasonable inference” possible in light of the “totality of 
evidence.”51  The decision underscored the fact-sensitive and subjective 
nature of deciding the issue of “obvious intoxication.” 
B.  Causation 
Upon determination an illegal sale occurred, the Civil Damages Act 
requires a plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to satisfy two causation 
questions: (1) was the illegal sale a cause of the intoxication, and if so (2) 
was the intoxication a cause of plaintiff’s injuries?52 
From a historical and developmental perspective, this two-step 
causation analysis reflects a slow departure from the “proximate 
contributing cause standard” initially codified in 1952 under Minnesota 
Statutes section 340.95.53  Subsequent cases confirm that judicial 
interpretation of this proximate cause standard required a plaintiff to 
show a defendant illegally sold liquor that “caused” intoxication and 
proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.54  However, following these 
cases, Minnesota courts avoided the occasion to expressly require that 
the causal relationships be proximate until the Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
 47. Id. at *8. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at *10. 
 50. Id. at *10-11. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. 1989). 
 53. MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1952) (repealed, 1985 ch. 305 art. 13 § 1; renumbered 
340A.801). 
 54. See Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 432, 57 N.W.2d 254, 258-59 
(1953) (liquor illegally sold need not be sole cause of intoxication; enough for liquor to 
be a proximately contributing cause); see also Strand v. Vill. of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 
419, 72 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1955) (intoxication must be the proximate cause of plaintiff’s 
injuries). 
8
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briefly revisited the issue in Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 
600.55  In Kryzer, an intoxicated plaintiff injured her wrist while being 
forcibly removed from the bar by an employee.56  Relying on case law 
from 1882,57 the Kryzer court rejected the “but for” causation test and 
made a distinction between the “occasion” and the “cause” of an injury.58  
The court clarified that, while plaintiff’s intoxication may have been the 
“occasion” for her ejection from the bar, it did not “cause” the injury to 
her wrist; rather, the act of the bar employee who ejected the plaintiff 
was the cause of her injury.59 
Following Kryzer, the causation standard appears to require a direct 
causal relationship between a person’s intoxication and the injury, 
demonstrated by a proximate-cause analysis rather than a “but for” test.  
Interestingly, Minnesota’s civil jury instructions for Civil Damages Act 
cases define direct cause as “a cause that had a substantial part in 
bringing about” the plaintiff’s injury.60  The supreme court has applied 
the substantial-factor test to determine whether a cause is direct.61 
1.  The Illegal Sale Caused or Contributed to the Intoxication 
Once a plaintiff establishes an illegal sale of alcoholic beverages, he 
or she must also prove the illegal sale caused or contributed to the 
alleged intoxicated person’s (AIP’s) intoxication.62  The illegally sold 
alcohol need not be the sole cause of intoxication.63  In evaluating 
whether the illegal sale contributed to the intoxication, the fact finder 
must determine whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a 
“practical and substantial relationship” between the illegal sale and 
subsequent intoxication.64 
 
 55. Kryzer v. Champlin Am. Legion No. 600, 494 N.W.2d 35, 37 (Minn. 1992). 
 56. Id. at 36. 
 57. Id. at 37 (citing Nelson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 74, 
14 N.W. 360 (1882)). 
 58. Kryzer, 494 N.W.2d at 37. 
 59. Id. 
 60. MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS’N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, 
MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (Civil) JIG 45.30 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter 
B. Knapp, rep.) in 4 MINN. PRACTICE 1, 268 (4th ed. 1999). 
 61. Id. at § 27.10. 
 62. See Weber v. Au, 512 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
“the civil liability statute requires a causal connection between the intoxication and the 
injury, not just the sale and the injury”). 
 63. See Murphy v. Hennen, 264 Minn. 457, 463, 119 N.W.2d 489, 493 (1963) (“It 
is enough if such intoxicants combine with other intoxicants that may have been legally 
sold or furnished to be a concurring or proximately contributing cause”). 
 64. See Kvanli v. Vill. of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 484, 139 N.W.2d 275, 277 
9
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This standard is sufficiently broad to address the various Dram Shop 
violations and the requisite illegal sale-intoxication nexus.  Like a fishing 
net cast in the sea, however, this broad standard may snare some alcohol 
vendors that, as a matter of common sense and public policy, should not 
be held liable under the Act.  For example, a bar that served the AIP a de 
minimus or negligible amount of alcohol could be found liable for 
making an “illegal sale” to an “obviously intoxicated person” even when 
its sale had little or no practical effect on the AIP’s intoxication or the 
plaintiff’s injuries.  Does the sale of a bottle of beer to a patron 
exhibiting borderline evidence of impairment—which is then only half-
consumed in five minutes by the patron before he leaves the bar, gets in 
his car and strikes a pedestrian crossing the street to the bar—create 
Dram Shop liability?  Should it? 
The appellate courts have yet to provide clear guidance in this area.  
There are no Minnesota cases specifically addressing such situations.  At 
best, Minnesota courts have touched this issue on a cursory level.65  In 
Hahn v. City of Ortonville, the supreme court held that liquor purchased 
at a municipal liquor store three or four hours earlier was a proximate 
cause of an assailant’s intoxication, despite considerable post-sale 
consumption of alcohol obtained elsewhere prior to the assault.66 
In Murphy v. Hennen, the supreme court reaffirmed that illegally 
sold intoxicants need be only a contributing cause to the resulting 
intoxication.67  In that case, an illegal sale was made to a minor who then 
gave the alcohol to an adult.68  The adult later became intoxicated and 
caused a motor vehicle accident.69  Once again, despite holding the sale 
contributed to the intoxication, the Murphy court noted that a time lapse 
or other variable existing between a sale and consumption “may negate 
causation as a matter of law.”70 
Finally, in Kvanli, a minor purchased an amount of alcohol from a 
liquor store and shared the alcohol with another minor, who caused a 
subsequent motor vehicle accident.71  Although the court affirmed the 
 
(1965). 
 65. See Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254 (1953); Murphy, 
264 Minn. 457, 119 N.W.2d 489; Kvanli, 272 Minn. 481, 139 N.W.2d 275. 
 66. See Hahn, 238 Minn. at 430-32, 57 N.W.2d at 258. 
 67. 264 Minn. at 463, 119 N.W.2d at 493. 
 68. Id. at 459, 199 N.W.2d at 490. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 463, 119 N.W.2d at 493; see also Swinfin v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 345, 346, 
34 N.W. 22, 22 (1887) (holding that damages are too remote where defendant furnished 
alcohol to an intoxicated person who then acted voluntarily to assault plaintiff). 
 71. Kvanli v. Vill. of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 483, 139 N.W.2d 275, 277 (1965). 
10
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finding of a causal connection between the sale and intoxication,72 the 
Kvanli court held that time lapses or the occurrence of other intervening 
events “could make the relationship between the sale and use too tenuous 
to permit a finding of causal relationship.”73 
Although the Hahn, Murphy, and Kvanli decisions set forth a 
general causation framework to link an illegal sale to the intoxication, the 
decisions do not provide clear instruction on delineating “de minimus” 
versus “material” consumption.  From a practical standpoint, Minnesota 
Dram Shop law remains without legislative guidance (or judicial 
interpretation) to separate negligible alcohol service from service 
actually “causing or contributing to” intoxication. 
In assessing this issue, Minnesota could turn to other jurisdictions 
for guidance.  Specifically, the Illinois Liquor Control Act,74 which is 
strikingly similar in expressing “cause” language and subsequent case 
law interpretation of the term, provides useful instruction. 
Similar to the Minnesota Civil Damages Act, the Illinois Liquor 
Control Act provides a cause of action for every person whose injury was 
in consequence of the intoxication of another and that the liquor service 
contributed to the intoxication.75  Once again, like the Minnesota Civil 
Damages Act, the Illinois Liquor Control Act reflects a legislative intent 
to shift responsibility for damages occasioned by the use of alcohol on to 
those who profit from its sale.76  Prior to 1971, Article VI, section 14 of 
the Act provided in pertinent part: “Every person who is injured in 
person or property by any intoxicated person, has a right of action . . . 
severally or jointly, against any person who by selling or giving alcoholic 
liquor, causes the intoxication, in whole or part, of such person.”77 
Based on the above provision, recovery was permissible under 
Illinois law upon showing of consumption in a particular Dram Shop and 
a resulting intoxication.78  As originally codified, the threshold burden 
 
 72. Id. at 484-85, 139 N.W.2d at 278. 
 73. Id. 
 74. § 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-5/12-4 (2003). 
 75. Id. at 5/6-21. 
 76. Cf. Carlson v. Thompson, 615 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (stating 
the fundamental purpose of Civil Damages Act is “to uphold liability in respect to people 
engaged in business, making profit in the provision of liquor”) with Kingston v. Turner, 
505 N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ill. 1987) (observing that the legislative intent of the Dram Shop 
Act is to place the responsibility for damages occasioned by the use of alcohol on those 
who profit from its sale (citing Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: The Effect of the 
1971 Amendment, 74 U. ILL. L. F. 466, 477 (1974))). 
 77. Kingston, 505 N.E.2d at 325 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. 1969, ch. 43, par. 135). 
 78. Kingston, 505 N.E.2d at 325. 
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for recovery was a showing the injury was in consequence of another’s 
intoxication and that the liquor served “contributed in some degree, no 
matter how slight,” to the intoxication.79 
However, following the 1971 amendment, the Illinois legislature 
eliminated the “in whole or part” language from the statute.80  As noted 
in subsequent scholarly review, the amendment was not intended to alter 
the legislative intent and instead reflected an attempt to narrow liability 
under the provision.81  Under the amended provision, recovery was 
allowed only against a person who, “by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, 
causes the intoxication.”82 
In light of the amendment, Illinois courts quickly clarified the 
causal requirement that the sale or provision of alcohol to the person 
causing injuries must materially contribute to the intoxication.83  In 
Thompson v. Tranberg, the Illinois Court of Appeals stated: 
We have concluded that the legislative intention in the use of 
the word “causes” in the Dram Shop Act is best effectuated by 
a focus on whether the defendant’s conduct was a material and 
substantial factor in producing or contributing to produce the 
intoxication . . . . It seems fair to conclude that the intent of the 
legislature with respect to the 1971 amendment was to 
eliminate the possibility that dram shop liability could be 
founded on any consumption of alcohol no matter how slight 
but to impose liability only when intoxication could be said as 
a matter of fact to have been caused by the dram shop.84 
Following Thompson, the Illinois Supreme Court in Nelson v. 
Araiza concluded the amended provisions applied because the defendant 
“must have caused the intoxication and not merely have furnished a 
negligible amount of liquor.”85  After Nelson, Illinois courts provided 
 
 79. See Osborn v. Leuffgen, 45 N.E.2d 622, 625 (Ill. 1943). 
 80. See ILL. REV. STAT. 1983, ch. 43, par. 135 (1971). 
 81. See Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: The Effect of the 1971 Amendment, 
74 U. Ill. L.F. 466, 477 (1977). 
 82. See ILL. REV. STAT. 1983, ch. 43, par. 135 (1977). 
 83. See Kingston v. Turner, 505 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. 1987); Nelson v. Araiza, 372 
N.E.2d 637, 639-40 (Ill. 1978) (holding that serving a negligible amount of alcoholic 
liquor does not constitute causing intoxication within the meaning of the statute); Mohr v. 
Jilg, 586 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Henry v. Bloomington Third Ward Cmty. Club, 
411 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Thompson v. Tranberg, 360 N.E.2d 108 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1977); Caruso v. Kazense, 313 N.E.2d 689, 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (stating the 
amendment imposes liability only on the person who “caused the intoxication rather than 
on any person who contributed to such condition”). 
 84. 360 N.E.2d at 111. 
 85. 372 N.E.2d at 639. 
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further clarification of what constituted a material contribution so as to 
“cause the intoxication” in Henry v. Bloomington Third Ward 
Community Club,86 Kingston v. Turner,87 and Mohr v. Jilg.88 
In Henry, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a bar’s liability for 
serving a small amount of alcohol to an already intoxicated person is a 
jury question, and evidence of such intoxication based solely on the 
plaintiff’s personal opinion was sufficient to present a jury question.89  In 
that case, plaintiff Charles Henry and his brothers began drinking in a 
tavern when Elmer Thomas (and a companion) entered the bar and 
ordered one ounce of alcoholic liquor.90  The plaintiff later testified 
Thomas appeared intoxicated before receiving the liquor based on his 
gait and unsteady appearance.91  Following minimal consumption of the 
liquor, Thomas and his companion assaulted Henry and his brothers, 
shooting Henry in the hip.92  Henry brought suit under the Dram Shop 
Act for personal injuries and the circuit court granted a directed verdict 
in favor of the tavern.93 
In reversing the directed verdict, the Henry court affirmed that “a 
dramshop which serves a negligible amount of liquor to a sober person 
would clearly not have ‘caused’ that person’s intoxication” under the 
Act.94  However, whether liability exists under the Act in light of 
plaintiff’s testimony that the patron was intoxicated upon service is a 
jury question.95  Specifically, the jury’s function in such cases is to 
determine whether the actions of the Dram Shop in providing service 
was a “material and substantial factor” in exacerbating his state of 
intoxication.96 
Later, in Kingston, the Illinois Supreme Court held it was possible 
for the jury to find that an individual was intoxicated at the time of the 
accident, but his intoxication was not caused by either of the two bars in 
which he drank, when no clear evidence was presented proving he drank 
more than a negligible amount at either bar.97  Here, John Berry and 
 
 86. 411 N.E.2d 540. 
 87. 505 N.E.2d 320. 
 88. 586 N.E.2d 807. 
 89. 411 N.E.2d at 543. 
 90. Id. at 541. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. at 541-42. 
 93. Id. at 541. 
 94. Id at 543. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 505 N.E.2d 320. 
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companions traveled among three taverns on his motorcycle over a three-
hour period, during which time Berry consumed a total of four, twelve-
ounce tap beers.  Evidence from companions and eyewitnesses suggested 
Berry was feeling the effects of the alcohol at the time of his departure.98  
Upon leaving the last tavern with a companion, Berry’s motorcycle 
struck plaintiff Kingston’s vehicle, killing Kingston.  Following suit by 
Kingston’s heirs under the Act, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
defendants, which the appellate court reversed.99 
Discussing the impropriety of the jury instruction relating to 
causation, the Kingston court explained that the amended Liquor Control 
Act “cause” provision does not equate the terms “result” and “cause.”  
Instead, guided by the previous Thompson holding, the Kingston court 
instructed that “cause” refers to conduct that was “a material and 
substantial factor in producing or contributing to produce the 
intoxication.”100  Consequently, the cause provision did not apply to de 
minimus contributions to a party’s intoxication, and merely furnishing a 
negligible amount of alcohol was no longer a sufficient basis for liability.  
Therefore, although alcohol furnished at two separate taverns may cause 
a single intoxication, a tavern may not be held liable for a de minimus 
contribution to an individual’s intoxication.101 
Most recently, the Illinois Appellate Court in Mohr held that a 
tavern that admittedly sold a relatively small amount of alcohol to a 
customer immediately before the customer left the parking lot and 
collided with plaintiff’s vehicle was liable under the Liquor Control 
Act.102  In that case, Defendant Dorothy Jilg consumed two twelve-
ounce cans of beer at the Oasis Bar over a two-hour period.  The plaintiff 
presented no evidence to suggest Jilg was already intoxicated when 
served, and the testimony conflicted concerning her subsequent 
intoxication.  Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Oasis.  
The plaintiff appealed the decision. 
Despite the holding, the Mohr court reasoned from Thompson and 
Kingston that to “cause” the intoxication of an individual, more than a 
negligible amount of alcohol is required.103  More importantly, the court 
considered the situation in which a patron enters a Dram Shop in an 
 
 98. See id. at 323. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 327. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Mohr v. Jilg, 586 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
 103. Id. at 807. 
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intoxicated state and consumes a relatively small amount of alcohol.  In 
such cases, the Mohr court reasoned liability is unsupported for the 
second tavern because the alcohol consumed contributed only a 
negligible amount to the intoxication.104  In discussing such 
circumstances, the court affirmed that while alcohol furnished at two 
separate taverns may both cause a patron’s intoxication, a tavern may not 
be held liable for a de minimus contribution to an individual’s 
intoxication.105 
Similar to the Minnesota Civil Damages Act, the Illinois Liquor 
Control Act is remedial legislation designed to shift responsibility for 
damages occasioned by the use of alcohol on those who profit from its 
sale.  In addition, the Minnesota and Illinois statutes are strikingly 
similar regarding their expression of “cause” language and subsequent 
case law interpretation of the term.  Both require that the liquor sale 
cause the intoxication, and qualify the “material and substantial” cause 
contributing to the intoxication. 
Faced with a causation standard similar to Minnesota’s, Illinois 
courts have created a clearer definition of the amount of alcohol that 
materially contributes to an intoxication and that therefore constitutes a 
contributing cause of that intoxication.  Illinois law provides well-
reasoned authority that the provision of a negligible amount of alcohol to 
an intoxicated person—where service was provided elsewhere—does not 
result in liability because the alcohol consumed contributed only a 
negligible amount to the intoxication.  When presented with the 
appropriate set of facts, Minnesota’s appellate courts should do the same, 
adopting Illinois’ standard that the illegal sale be “a material and 
substantial factor in providing or contributing to produce the 
intoxication.”106 
2.  The Intoxication Caused the Injury 
The claimant bears the burden of establishing that the illegal sale 
was the proximate cause of his or her damages.107  As discussed above, 
 
 104. Id. at 810. 
 105. Id. 
   106.   Kingston v. Turner 505 N.E.2d 320, 327 (Ill. 1987). 
 107. Kryzer v. Champlin Am. Legion No. 600, 494 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1992) 
(citing Adamson v. Doughety, 248 Minn. 535, 542, 81 N.W.2d 110, 115 (1957)).  See 
also Hastings v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 
(finding that a plaintiff who crosses over the center line of the highway into an alleged 
intoxicated person may fail to establish a causal connection between his injuries and the 
illegal sale to the AIP). 
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in Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 600, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court rejected a “but for” causation test to this element of a 
Dram Shop claim.108 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently discussed proximate 
cause in an unpublished case, Brockman v. Beacons Sports Bar & 
Grill.109  Brockman, Price, and Brockman’s cousin were drinking at 
Beacons Sports Bar & Grill (Beacons) in Duluth, Minnesota.110  Price 
consumed beer and one Windsor Coke mixed drink before leaving 
Beacons with Brockman and the others.111  “Price drove erratically, went 
through a stop sign, and then backed into a ditch . . . . As Brockman and 
his cousin tried to push Price’s car out of the ditch, the car moved 
backward and pinned Brockman against a retaining wall, causing a 
severe crush-type injury to his left thigh and perineum . . . . Brockman 
was hospitalized for about a month.”112  He left the hospital with a small, 
open wound, which later became infected.113  Brockman underwent 
surgery to drain the infection; he died of sudden, unexpected 
cardiovascular collapse during administration of general anesthesia.114 
Brockman’s father sued Beacons, alleging a violation of 
Minnesota’s Dram Shop Act.115  The trial court granted Beacons’ motion 
for summary judgment, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that Beacons made an illegal sale and that the illegal sale 
proximately caused Brockman’s death.  Brockman’s father appealed.116 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and began its analysis in 
Brockman noting “[t]he person bringing the action must show that the 
illegal sale caused the intoxication, and the intoxication was the 
‘proximate cause’ of the injuries sustained.”117  Consequences that 
“follow in an unbroken sequence from the original wrongful act, without 
an intervening efficient cause, are natural and proximate, and the original 
wrongdoer is responsible for these consequences even when the 
particular result is not foreseeable.”118  The court noted, “the concept of 
 
 108. 494 N.W.2d at 37. 
 109. Brockman v. Beacons Sports Bar & Grill, No. C8-02-76, slip op. (Minn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 10, 2002). 
 110. Id. at 2. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 3. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (citing Kryzer, 494 N.W.2d at 36). 
 118. Brockman, No. C8-02-76, slip op. at 4 (citing Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 
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proximate cause has always encompassed unforeseen medical 
complications that develop from the original injury.”119  In addition, the 
court of appeals found, “Brockman sustained injuries that required 
extended hospitalization, necessitated surgery that required a general 
anesthetic, and the administration of anesthesia triggered the circulatory 
arrest that resulted in Brockman’s death.”120  It added the observation 
that “proximate cause also encompasses the aggravation of the original 
injury caused by the administration of necessary medical care.”121 
The Brockman court, summing up its reversal of the trial court’s 
decision, concluded: 
The evidence establishes that, at the time of the surgery, 
Brockman was an otherwise healthy, 25-year-old man.  It is 
undisputed that the surgery was a reasonable and necessary 
procedure to treat injuries sustained in the car accident.  The 
medical evidence supports a claim that the administration of 
anesthesia was responsible for triggering the circulatory arrest. 
On these facts, the evidence is sufficient to create a triable 
issue on proximate cause, it was therefore error to grant 
summary judgment on that issue.122 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to embrace (or precisely 
define) a formal proximate cause standard in the Dram Shop context.  
However, the Brockman holding may forecast the future of which 
proximate cause analysis will govern. 
The Brockman court’s analysis focuses on common-law negligence 
principles, which emphasize the hindsight (substantial factor) rather than 
foresight (foreseeability) to determine whether the necessary casual link 
exists between the intoxication and the ultimate injury.  Although the 
Brockman decision seems limited to more attenuated (and less direct) 
circumstance and is of no precedential value, it certainly signals 
traditional common-law principles may predominate proximate cause 
analyses until the Minnesota Supreme Court weighs in on this issue.  In 
these authors’ humble opinion, until that time, similar “unbroken chains” 
 
452, 454-55, 107 N.W.2d 859, 861-62 (1961)). 
 119. Brockman, No. C8-02-76, slip op. at 4; see Keegan v. Mpls. & St. Louis R.R. 
Co., 76 Minn. 90, 91, 78 N.W. 965, 965 (1899) (establishing that the negligence of the 
defendant was the proximate cause of the injury and, therefore, determining whether or 
not the result that followed was reasonably anticipated is immaterial). 
 120. Brockman, No. C8-02-76, slip op. at 4. 
 121. Id. at 4-5 (citing Couillar v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 253 Minn. 418, 422, 92 
N.W.2d 96, 99 (1958)) (recognizing that the original tortfeasor remains responsible for 
proximate results of act even though injury is more serious as a result of medical care)). 
 122. Brockman, No. C8-02-76, slip op. at 6. 
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may shackle liquor establishments (and their insurers) to increased Dram 
Shop related liability. 
III. PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES 
A.  Who May Bring a Claim? 
Minnesota Statutes section 340A.801 provides a right of action for 
“a spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in 
person, property, or means of support, or who incurs other pecuniary 
loss . . . .”123  The Minnesota Supreme Court held the term “other 
person” refers to any other person injured by the intoxication of another 
if that injured person played no role in the intoxication.124 
In the case of Haugland v. Mapleview Lounge Bottleshop, Inc., the 
court discussed who is empowered to bring a claim under the Civil 
Damages Act.125  On February 20, 1999, Robert John Donovan, Sr. died 
in an automobile accident, leaving his son and Haugland, his son’s 
maternal aunt.126  On February 12, 2001, Haugland served a summons 
and complaint on Mapleview Lounge Bottleshop, Inc. (Mapleview 
Lounge), asserting claims under Minnesota Statutes sections 340A.801 
and 340A.802.127  “The caption of the complaint identified the plaintiff 
as ‘Debra K. Haugland, as trustee for the next of kin of Robert John 
Donovan, Sr.’ ”128  The trial court granted Mapleview Lounge’s motion 
to dismiss on the ground “that the action for injury to Donovan’s 
survivors could not be brought in the name of a trustee for the next of 
kin, and the complaint could not be amended to name the real party in 
interest because the applicable two-year statute of limitations had 
expired.”129  Haugland appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 
Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals held that under the 
Dram Shop Act a plaintiff must prove she suffered damages and must 
bring the claim in her own name.130 The court noted, “Haugland’s 
complaint . . . does not allege that Haugland suffered any loss, as trustee 
or in any other capacity . . . . Therefore [Haugland] . . . did not have a 
 
 123. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2002). 
 124. Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn. 1998). 
 125. 643 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 126. Id. at 620. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 622 (citing Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 45, 70 N.W.2d 886, 898 (1995)). 
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right of action under the Civil Damages Act.”131 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.132  In permitting 
amendment of the complaint, the supreme court focused on Minnesota’s 
status as a “notice pleading” state and the lack of prejudice in permitting 
amendment.  Justice Page, writing for the unanimous court, reasoned that 
although the original, improperly captioned complaint did not identify a 
proper party, the complaint provided the defendant with legally sufficient 
notice of a civil damages action.133  As the proposed amendment arose 
out of the same occurrence set forth in the original complaint, Minnesota 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01 permitted amendment.134 
Haugland is the Minnesota Supreme Court’s first decision 
interpreting the Civil Damages Act since 2001.  The case’s relevance lies 
in its clarification of the procedural peculiarities of the Civil Damages 
Act.  Haugland’s claim would have withstood dismissal had she brought 
the action in the name of the injured party, not in her own name as 
trustee of the injured party.  Alternatively, the claim apparently would 
have survived if Haugland would have simply alleged personal loss or 
injury in her complaint. 
IV. TIMING REQUIREMENTS 
A.  Written Notice of Claim 
Minnesota Statutes section 340A.802, subdivisions 1 and 2, require 
written notice of injury to licensed retailers or municipal liquor stores 
when a Dram Shop action is contemplated against one of these 
entities.135  The notice of claim requirement states: 
In the case of a claim for damages, the notice must be served 
by the claimant’s attorney within 240 days of the date of 
entering an attorney-client relationship with the person in 
regard to the claim.  In the case of claims for contribution or 
indemnity, the notice must be served within 120 days after the 
injury occurs or within 60 days after receiving written notice of 
a claim for contribution or indemnity, whichever is applicable. 
No action for damage or for contribution or indemnity may be 
 
 131. Hauglund, 643 N.W.2d at 622. 
 132. Hauglund ex rel. Donovan v. Mapleview Lounge & Bottleshop, Inc., 666 
N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 2003). 
 133. Id. at 694. 
 134. MINN. R. CIV. P. 15.01. 
 135. MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 2 (2002). 
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maintained unless the notice has been given.136 
A plaintiff who brings a claim under the Dram Shop Act bears the 
burden of proving the licensee had notice of a possible claim within the 
statutory notice period.137  In Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill, 
Inc., the Minnesota Court of Appeals took up the question of whether a 
civil complaint alone can satisfy the notice requirement.138 
Jolane Wood’s boyfriend suffered injuries in an automobile accident 
after leaving Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill (Diamonds), where he was 
drinking.139  Wood, who eventually married the boyfriend, filed a Dram 
Shop claim against Diamonds under the Civil Damages Act.140  Wood’s 
attorney served a summons and complaint on Diamonds, containing the 
information required by the notice statute, within 240 days after entering 
into an attorney-client relationship with Wood.141  However, after the 
accident and before she initiated the Dram Shop action, Wood retained 
another attorney to file bankruptcy.  The bankruptcy attorney provided 
no written notice of a Dram Shop claim to Diamonds.142  Diamonds 
moved for summary judgment, arguing Wood failed to give proper 
notice: “(1) by not serving notice within 240 days after entering into an 
attorney-client relationship with the bankruptcy attorney and (2) by not 
serving notice before serving the complaint.”143  The district court denied 
Diamonds’ motion and Diamonds appealed.144 
The court of appeals recounted the Civil Damages Act’s notice 
requirement: 
A person who claims damages . . . from a licensed retailer of 
alcoholic beverages . . . for or because of an injury within the 
scope of section 340A.801 must give written notice to the 
licensee . . . stating: 
(1) the time and date when and person to whom the alcoholic 
beverages were sold or bartered; 
(2) the name and address of the person or persons who were 
injured or whose property was damaged; and 
(3) the approximate time and date, and the place where the 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Schulte v. Corner Club Bar, 544 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Minn. 1996). 
 138. 654 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 139. Id. at 706. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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injury to person or property occurred.145 
Furthermore, 
In the case of a claim for damages, the notice must be served 
by the claimant’s attorney within 240 days of the date of 
entering an attorney-client relationship with the person in 
regard to the claim.146 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Diamond’s 
motion for summary judgment, observing that nothing in the statute 
precluded giving the required notice via service of a complaint that 
provided the information required by statute within 240 days after an 
attorney is retained.147  Diamonds argued that the purpose of the notice 
requirement is to allow the licensee time to conduct a prelitigation 
investigation of the facts.148  While recognizing the supreme court’s 
observance that the notice requirement helps provide Dram Shops with 
an early opportunity to investigate claims, the Wood court noted, 
“Diamonds admits that, if a process server were to hand to a licensee 
notice first and then a summons and complaint containing the same 
factual information seconds later, the notice requirement would be 
satisfied.”149  The court stated, “This would be an absurd triumph of 
form over substance, and we must presume that the legislature did not 
intend such a result.”150  The court held that “service of a complaint that 
contains the information described in section 340A.802, subdivision 1, 
within the 240-day specified in section 340A.802, subdivision 2, satisfies 
the dram-shop notice requirement.”151 
B.  Statute of Limitations 
In Minnesota, a plaintiff must commence an action within the time 
periods provided in Minnesota Statutes section 541.01, except where a 
statute prescribes a different limitation.152  The Civil Damages Act 
 
 145. Id. at 707 (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 1 (2002)). 
 146. Wood, 654 N.W.2d at 707 (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 2).  Because 
Diamonds failed to raise in its main brief the issue of whether the bankruptcy attorney 
should have provided notice of Wood’s Dram Shop claim, the issue was not properly 
before the court and was not addressed. 
 147. Wood, 654 N.W.2d at 708. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 708-09. 
 150. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (2002). 
 151. Wood, 654 N.W.2d at 709 (citing Wegan v. Vill. of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 
273, 280 (Minn. 1981)). 
 152. MINN. STAT. § 541.01 (2002).  “In ascertaining the intention of the legislature 
21
Celichowski and Johnson: Essay: Recent Developments in Minnesota Dram Shop Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
10 JOHNSON - PAGINATED.DOC 12/8/2003  2:54 PM 
634 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
 
states, “No action may be maintained under Section § 340A.801 unless 
commenced within two years after injury.”153  However, two specific 
instances have addressed the application of the limitations requirements 
in the Civil Damages Act: (1) claims made by minors, and (2) the notice 
requirements for contribution and indemnity claims by tortfeasors against 
liquor vendors. 
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 541.15(a)(1), the statutes of 
limitations for most claims brought by minors are tolled until they reach 
age 19.154  However, as noted above, the statute of limitations under the 
Civil Damages Act requires actions to be brought within two years of the 
injury and does not address tolling of the limitation period.155  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Whitener ex rel. Miller v. Dahl addressed 
the discrepancy between the minority tolling statute and the Civil 
Damages Act.156 
Sandra Bower spent the night drinking at the Flowing Well Supper 
Club and suffered fatal injuries in a car accident after leaving the club.157  
Her four minor children filed a lawsuit against Flowing Well asserting 
claims under the Minnesota Civil Damages Act for damages resulting 
from respondent’s allegedly illegal sale of alcohol to their mother hours 
before her death in a car accident.158  They served suit on the bar on 
April 1, 1999, more than three years after Sandra Bowers’ fatal 
accident.159  Flowing Well moved for summary judgment because the 
plaintiffs commenced the action after the two-year limitation under 
Minnesota Statutes section 340A.802, subdivision 2.160  The plaintiffs 
objected, arguing their action was timely under the minority-tolling 
statute, Minnesota Statutes section 541.15(a)(1).161  Flowing Well came 
up dry when the trial court denied its motion and certified the question: 
“Is the statute of limitations, for the cause of action of the minor children 
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 340A.801 et seq., tolled pursuant to Minn. Stat. 
 
the courts may be guided by the following presumptions: (1) The legislature does not 
intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable . . .”  MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.17 (2002). 
 153. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2002). 
 154. MINN. STAT. § 541.15(a)(1) (2002). 
 155. MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 2 (2002). 
 156. 625 N.W.2d 827 (Minn. 2001). 
 157. Id. at 828. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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§ 541.15?”162  The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded the minor 
plaintiffs’ claims were not barred; therefore, the two-year statute of 
limitations barred their claims.  The supreme court affirmed.163 
The supreme court began its analysis in Whitener recognizing the 
apparent conflict between Minnesota’s minority-tolling statute and the 
Civil Damages Act.164  “The minority-tolling statute creates a general 
exception to statutes of limitations for claims of minors, and provides . . . 
that the running of the statute of limitations on a cause of action shall be 
suspended as to a minor plaintiff until one year after the minor reaches 
age eighteen.”165  “The Civil Damages Act . . . contains its own statute of 
limitations requiring commencement of an action within two years after 
the date of injury.”166  Citing Cashman v. Hedberg,167 the state’s highest 
court observed that it would make no exception to the limitations period 
provided by a statute granting a statutorily created right unless that 
statute contains a clause stating general tolling statutes or other 
exceptions apply.168  The court implicitly adopted the court of appeals’ 
review of the indicia of legislative intent, noting: 
[B]ecause the minority-tolling statute was enacted long before 
the Civil Damages Act, the legislature could not have intended 
the tolling statute to apply to a statutorily-created cause of 
action not then in existence.  The court noted we have long 
held that because the right to bring an action for wrongful 
death is granted by statute in derogation of the common law, it 
is conditioned upon compliance with the statute of limitations 
contained in the statute creating the right.169 
In finding the four minor plaintiffs failed to timely commence their 
action, the supreme court found ample evidence the legislature did not 
intend to allow the minor tolling statute to extend the Civil Damages Act 
two-year statute of limitations.170 
The case of Wollan v. Jahnz171 addressed the applicability of a six-
year statute of limitations to a claim under the Civil Damages Act, 
Minnesota Statutes section 340A.801, subdivision 6 for providing 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 541.15(a), 340A.801-.802 (2000)). 
 165. Whitener, 625 N.W.2d at 828-29 (citing MINN. STAT. § 541.15(a) (2000)). 
 166. Whitener, 625 N.W.2d at 829. 
 167. 215 Minn. 463, 467, 10 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1943). 
 168. Whitener, 625 N.W.2d at 829. 
 169. Id. at 829-30 (citing Cashman, 215 Minn. at 467-72, 10 N.W.2d at 391-93). 
 170. Whitener, 625 N.W.2d at 833-34. 
 171. 656 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
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alcohol to a minor who then injures another.172  Grizzly’s Sports Bar 
hosted an employee Christmas party and provided alcoholic beverages to 
Jahnz, an employee younger than 21, who then became intoxicated.173  
Later, Jahnz was driving a snowmobile with Wollan as a passenger when 
the snowmobile flipped, injuring Wollan.174  Wollan sued Jahnz in 1998 
and in August 2001 sought to amend the complaint to include Grizzly’s 
Sports Bar (Grizzly’s) and its owners under Minnesota Statutes section 
340A.801, subdivision 6.175  Grizzly’s moved to dismiss the case based 
on the two-year statute of limitations.176  Wollan argued the two-year 
limitations period did not apply to her claim and that it was timely based 
on the six-year limitation period for common-law negligence actions 
under Minnesota Statutes section 541.05, subdivision 1(5).177  The trial 
court granted Grizzly’s motion to dismiss.178  Wollan appealed.179 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals began its analysis by noting the 
judicial and legislative history of claims brought by minors related to the 
illegal provision of alcohol.180  In 1985, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held in Holmquist v. Miller181 that “a social host is not liable in a 
common-law action for negligently serving alcohol to a minor.”182 
Reacting to the supreme court’s decision in Holmquist, the Minnesota 
Legislature amended the Civil Damages Act to provide: “Nothing in this 
chapter precludes common law tort claims against any person 21 years or 
older who knowingly provides or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a 
person under the age of 21 years.”183 
In light of its legislative and judicial heritage, the Wollan court 
reasoned Minnesota Statutes section 340A.801, subdivision 6 did not 
create a new cause of action and merely granted permission to apply 
common-law negligence principles to service-to-minor-related tort 
 
 172. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (2002) ( “Nothing in this chapter precludes 
common law tort claims against any person 21 years old or older who knowingly 
provides or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person under the age of 21 years.”) 
 173. Wollan, 656 N.W.2d at 417. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 418. 
 181. 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985). 
 182. Wollan, 656 N.W.2d at 418 (citing Holmquist, 367 N.W.2d at 472). 
 183. Wollan, 656 N.W.2d at 418 (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (2002)); 
VanWagner v. Mattison, 533 N.W.2d 75, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
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claims.184  More precisely, subdivision 6’s tacit approval of common law 
actions (against both social hosts and other alcohol vendors) validated 
ongoing application of the six-year statute of limitations under 
Minnesota Statutes section 541.05, subdivision 1(5). 
At first blush, it may be difficult to reconcile the decisions in 
Haugland, Wood, Whitener, and Wollan.  Upon a closer analysis, 
however, the cases are distinguishable and reflect the appellate court’s 
desire to strictly construe and curb the scope of legislatively created 
causes of action, while at the same time providing injured parties the 
opportunity to pursue their claims despite purported technical 
deficiencies.  Although Wood and Haugland were decided by different 
appellate courts and involved interpretations of different procedural 
provisions of the Civil Damages Act, both cases reflect an underlying 
judicial distaste for depriving Dram Shop plaintiffs of their claims based 
solely on procedural technicalities.  The supreme court’s decision in 
Haugland goes further in this regard than the court of appeals ruling in 
Wood, but both are defensible decisions given the public policy 
underlying the Civil Damages Act and the rationale employed by both 
reviewing bodies.  Similarly, the court of appeals’ decision in Wollan 
reflects a careful and purposeful preservation of common law claims 
against potential liquor vendors and providers, based solely on the 
common-law pedigree of the claims.  The supreme court’s ruling in 
Whitener maintained the court’s long-standing policy of strictly adhering 
to the language of statutes creating causes of action not recognized at 
common law even in the face of arguably harsh results. 
V. DAMAGES 
A.  Loss of Means of Support 
Courts have defined “loss of means of support” as an “actual 
diminution in the plaintiff’s standard of living.”185  It is not limited to 
damages to which the injured party had a legal right; the plaintiff may 
recover for any and all damages.186 
 
 184. Wollan, 656 N.W2d at 418.  It is difficult to understand this analysis.  If the 
common law did not recognize tort claims for providing a minor with alcoholic beverages 
in the first place, a statute that permits something that never existed should be a nullity. 
 185. Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395, 404 (Minn. 1977) (citing Herbes v. Vill. of 
Holdingford, 267 Minn. 75, 84, 125 N.W.2d 426, 432 (1963)). 
 186. Fitzer, 253 N.W.2d at 398. 
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In Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. A & A Liquors of St. Cloud, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals clarified the meaning of “loss-of-means-of-
support” under Minnesota Statutes section 340A.801.187  The plaintiff, 
who alleged damages because of A & A’s violation of the Civil Damages 
Act, moved for a declaration that he was entitled to loss-of-means-of-
support coverage under A & A’s liquor-liability policy for the reduction 
in his standard of living pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 
340A.801.188  The district court denied his motion and he appealed.189 
Plaintiff contended the district court erred by concluding that under 
the Civil Damages Act, he could not recover for “loss of means of 
support” and “bodily-injury” damages.190  The court of appeals affirmed 
the trial court.191  It noted the Civil Damages Act “is both penal and 
remedial because while the statute serves to punish an offending vendor 
and deter others from making illegal sales of liquor, it also serves to 
compensate those who would under ordinary circumstances or other tort 
principles obtain no recovery for their injuries.”192 
Therefore, the court reasoned, the statute requires a liquor 
establishment to carry an insurance policy containing minimum limits for 
both bodily injury and “loss of support.”193  Nevertheless, the court 
concluded the Civil Damages Act did not allow appellant to claim loss-
of-support damages for himself.194  The court observed that, “Minn. Stat. 
§ 340A.801, subd. 1, which is the only provision that confers a cause of 
action under the Civil Damages Act, does not include the injured 
person.”195  Although the statute did not define means of support, the 
court found that this phrase “incorporates within it the requirement that a 
claimant be a dependent.”196  The court bolstered its conclusion by 
noting “no reported Minnesota cases have ever granted ‘loss-of-means-
of-support’ damages to the injured ‘breadwinner.’  Rather, the loss-of-
 
 187. 649 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 188. Id. at 869. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 871. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. (citing Hannah v. Chmielewski, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1982)). 
 193. Britamco, 649 N.W.2d at 871 (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.409, subd. 1(1) 
(2000)). 
 194. Britamco, 649 N.W.2d at 871. 
 195. Id. at 872. 
 196. Id.; see Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726, 730 (Minn. 1981) (comparing the 
damages of Dram Shop claims to the damages for wrongful death claims, the court states 
that the damages that are common for both the negligent tortfeasors and the Dram Shop 
tortfeasors are those damages that will compensate the surviving spouse and children for 
loss of means of support). 
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/10
10 JOHNSON - PAGINATED.DOC 12/8/2003  2:54 PM 
2003] DRAM SHOP LAW DEVELOPMENTS 639 
 
support cases have involved dependents.”197 
B.  Pecuniary Loss 
In 1982, the legislature amended the Civil Damages Act to allow 
recovery of pecuniary losses in addition to damages for injury to person, 
property, and means of support.  The phrase “pecuniary loss” means 
damages for loss of advice, comfort, assistance, and protection.198  A 
claim for “pecuniary loss” is an independent action brought by a spouse 
who is dependent on the other person’s support.199 
In the recent, unpublished case of DeSanti v. Youngs, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals clarified the issue of pecuniary loss damages and held 
they are not limited to Dram Shop claims resulting in death.200  In 
DeSanti, the jury found both The Barn and Youngs negligent and 
apportioned 50% fault to each.201  The Barn moved for JNOV or, 
alternatively, a new trial.202  The trial court denied The Barn’s motion 
and entered judgment against it for $628,274.94, which included 
$200,000 awarded to John DeSanti for pecuniary loss.203  The Barn 
appealed. 
On appeal, The Barn argued that pecuniary loss should apply only 
to Civil Damages Act cases where the individual for whom a loss is 
claimed is dead.204  Affirming the trial court, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals began its analysis of the case quoting the Civil Damages Act, 
which provides, in pertinent part, 
A spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person 
injured in person, property, or means of support, or who incurs 
other pecuniary loss by an intoxicated person or by the 
intoxication of another person, has a right of action in the 
person’s own name for all damages sustained against a person 
who caused the intoxication of that person by illegally selling 
alcoholic beverages.205 
It further noted, “Pecuniary loss damages include loss of aid, 
 
 197. Britamco, 649 N.W.2d at 872. 
 198. Brault v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 538 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 199. Id. 
 200. DeSanti v. Youngs, No. C8-02-1311, slip op. (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003). 
 201. Id. at 4. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 11. 
 205. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (2002) (alteration in original)). 
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advice, comfort, and protection.”206  Noting it previously addressed the 
same issue in Coolidge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals held that “[t]he term ‘pecuniary loss’ has a common 
and approved definition, which contains no limitation to ‘death’ 
cases.”207  The court observed the statutory language analyzed in 
Coolidge had not changed;208 therefore, it concluded the Civil Damages 
Act contained no ambiguity regarding how pecuniary loss damages may 
be applied.  Plaintiffs were not barred from recovering pecuniary loss 
damages even though the party directly injured by the AIP remained 
alive. 
Perhaps no area in Minnesota’s Dram Shop jurisprudence is as 
fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty as the interplay between the 
damages allowed under the statute and the provisions of the liquor 
liability policies designed to provide coverage for Dram Shop claims.  It 
all began with the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in Brault v. 
Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co.209 
The Dram Shop Act requires that liquor purveyors maintain an 
insurance policy providing $50,000/$100,000 in liability coverage for 
bodily injury and $50,000/$100,000 coverage for loss of means of 
support.210  In 1987, the Minnesota Legislature modified the Dram Shop 
Act to add to the list of injuries recovery of “pecuniary” losses in 
addition to damages for injury to person, property, and means of support. 
The 1987 modification essentially “grafted” pecuniary loss damages into 
the Act as a type of recoverable damages, but the legislature did not 
expressly indicate whether “pecuniary loss” damages were a category 
separate from statutorily required loss of means of support coverage 
and/or bodily injury coverage.  In Brault, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals was asked to determine the extent of coverage offered by two 
different liquor liability policies. The first, from Acceptance Indemnity 
Insurance Co., was determined by the court to be ambiguous because the 
insuring clause, which made no reference to the phrase “pecuniary loss,” 
promised to cover the bar for “all” amounts the bar was obligated to pay 
resulting from liability under the Civil Damages Act.211  Since the policy 
 
 206. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311, slip op. at 11 (citing Coolidge v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 523 N.W.2d 5, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 207. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311, slip op.  at 11-12 (citing Coolidge, 523 N.W.2d at 7). 
 208. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311, slip op. at 12; see MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 
(2002). 
 209. 538 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 210. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.409, subd. 1(1). 
 211. Brault, 538 N.W.2d at 148. 
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did not provide a limit for “pecuniary loss,” the court concluded the 
aggregate liability limits ($300,000) applied.212  Similarly, the Brault 
court found the second policy at issue, promulgated by Empire Fire & 
Marine Insurance Co., did not adequately delineate between coverage for 
pecuniary loss and bodily injury damages.213  Empire argued pecuniary 
loss damages were payable subject to the bodily injury limits of $50,000, 
but the court of appeals brusquely dismissed this argument by noting 
“[p]ecuniary loss is not bodily injury . . . .”214 As with the Acceptance 
policy, it found the $300,000 aggregate policy limits applied.215 
Reading between the lines of Brault, the court’s primary issue with 
the underlying policy was its failure to account for a specific separate 
item of damages (pecuniary loss) permitted under the Minnesota Dram 
Shop Act.  In reaction to Brault, many insurers modified the language in 
their policies to provide that loss of means of support includes damages 
for pecuniary loss.  Some practitioners do not believe these modifications 
adequately address the so-called Brault issue, contending that in many 
instances these attempts improperly dilute statutory minimum coverage 
for “loss of means of support.”216  To date, no Minnesota appellate 
courts have reviewed whether such attempted policy modifications 
would pass muster under Brault or not. 
Insurers dissatisfied or concerned about the validity of adding 
“pecuniary loss” to a policy’s coverage limits for “loss of means of 
support” may want to consider having their policies separately define 
“pecuniary loss” and include separate limits of liability for “pecuniary 
loss” damages.217  The statute, as currently written, does not provide any 
minimum limits for pecuniary loss as in the case of “loss of means of 
support” and “bodily injury,” both of which require minimum limits of 
$50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence.  An insurer could 
simply add pecuniary loss as a category of coverage distinct from bodily 
injury and loss of means of support.  Theoretically, the insurer could 
establish any limit it felt reasonable because the statute defines only 
pecuniary loss as the measure of damages but does not establish a 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 148-49. 
 214. Id. at 149. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Leo Feeney and Patricia Yoedicke, Obtaining Maximum Dram Shop 
Coverage for Innocent Victims, MINNESOTA TRIAL LAWYER, Winter 1998, Vol. 23, No. 1, 
at 14. 
 217. We are indebted to our colleague, Mark Condon, for his ideas and suggestions 
in this regard. 
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minimum required insurance coverage limit for it.  A safe approach 
would be to add a separate coverage limit of $50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per occurrence.  As the insurer adopting such an approach 
would potentially be accepting more risk and exposure, it would have to 
adjust premiums accordingly. 
Perhaps a better approach would be for the legislature to amend the 
Civil Damages Act to address the Brault problem.  As the Civil Damages 
Act provides a statutory cause of action for claims generally not 
recognized under the common law, the legislature has very broad 
discretion in delineating the scope of damages awarded and the minimum 
insurance coverage limits for those damages.  The easiest and cleanest 
way to do so would involve amending the statute to specifically provide 
that the statutory minimum limits for “loss of means of support” 
encompass “pecuniary loss” damages.  If the legislature, in its judgment, 
believed such an approach diminished the ability of plaintiffs to recover 
“pecuniary loss” damages, it could increase the statutory minimum for 
“loss of means of support.” 
Another approach could involve eliminating the separate statutory 
minimum limits for “bodily injury” and “loss of means of support” and 
establish single, unitary minimum limits for all damages recoverable 
under the Civil Damages Act.  For example, the minimum limits could 
be $100,000 per person, $200,000 per occurrence and $300,000 
aggregate.218 
VI. COMPARATIVE FAULT 
In the waning days of the 2003 legislative session, the Minnesota 
Legislature approved an amendment to Minnesota Statutes 604.02, 
subdivision 1 that substantially alters Minnesota law with regard to joint 
and several liability.  The amendment, which applies to “claims arising 
from events that occur on or after August 1, 2003,” reads as follows: 
Subdivision 1. [JOINT LIABILITY.] When two or more 
persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in 
proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, 
except that the following persons are jointly and severally 
liable for the whole award: 
 
 218. Obviously, the legislature would have to consider many factors in adopting such 
an approach, including the public policy underlying the CDA, the nature and extent of 
damages suffered by plaintiffs in these cases, and the impact on liquor liability insurance 
availability and cost. 
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(1) a person whose fault is greater than 50 percent; 
(2) two or more persons who act in a common scheme or plan 
that results in injury; 
(3) a person who commits an intentional tort; or 
(4) a person whose liability arises under chapters 18B—
pesticide control, 115—water pollution control, 115A—waste 
management, 115B—environmental response and liability, 
115C—leaking underground storage tanks, and 299J—pipeline 
safety, public nuisance law for damage to the environment or 
the public health, any other environmental or public health law, 
or any environmental or public health ordinance or program of 
a municipality as defined in section 466.01. 
 
Before the amendment, Minnesota’s comparative fault law provided 
different limitations on joint and several liability.219  For example, a 
person whose apportioned fault was 15% or less could be jointly and 
severally responsible for no more than four times her apportioned share 
of fault.220  For example, if a defendant was found 10% at fault, she 
could be jointly and severally liable for no more than 40% of an entire 
award or verdict.  If, however, that defendant were found 16% or more at 
fault, she could be responsible for the entire award.  Minnesota’s prior 
comparative fault statute also included a “cap” on joint and several 
liability for municipalities, which provides that if municipalities were 
less than 35% at fault, they could be held responsible for no more than 
two times the allocated fault.221  For example, if a city were found 20% 
at fault, it could be held responsible for no more than 40% of a verdict 
subject, of course, to any other caps on municipal tort liability.  On the 
other hand, if that city were found 36% at fault, it could be responsible 
for the entire verdict, again subject to any municipal tort liability caps. 
Under the new joint and several liability statute, it appears neither a 
person nor a municipality could be held jointly and severally responsible 
for an entire award unless the person or municipality were found 51% or 
more at fault.222  The implications of this change in Minnesota’s 
comparative fault landscape are enormous.  Drunken drivers, who cause 
 
 219. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 1 (2002). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 1 (2003).  The new statute also provides for joint 
and several liability where two or more persons act in a common scheme or plan resulting 
in injury, a person commits an intentional tort, or a person incurs liability under various 
specified environmental, public nuisance, and public health statutes.  Id. 
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the vast majority of carnage leading to Minnesota Dram Shop cases, 
often have no insurance or carry the statutory minimum “30/60” limits.  
Plaintiffs, whether they suffer bodily injury or pecuniary loss/loss of 
means of support, often have potential damages far exceeding the 
relatively modest insurance limits of the AIP/drunken driver.  The 
incentive to pursue Dram Shop claims against a bar, which may carry 
insurance limits ranging from the statutory minimum of “50/100/300” to 
$1 million or more in such situations, is plain on its face.  Before this 
amendment, a bar found 16% responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries could 
be jointly and severally liable for the entire verdict.  Following the 
amendment, if the accident occurs on or after August 1, 2003, and the bar 
is 50% or less responsible for plaintiff’s damages, that bar will be 
responsible only for its apportioned share of fault.  The following 
example illustrates the huge impact this change will have on a typical 
Dram Shop case.223 
1. Assume a jury made the following allocation of fault 
between the AIP/drunken driver, Bill Turnipp, and the Happy 
Tap bar: AIP, 80% at fault and Happy Tap 20% at fault. 
(Plaintiff was not at fault.)  Furthermore, assume the AIP’s 
auto liability limits are $30,000 and the bar’s applicable liquor 
liability limits are $100,000.  Finally, assume the plaintiff has 
$100,000 in damages. 
2.  If the accident causing the plaintiff’s damages and incurring 
defendants’ liability occurred before August 1, 2003, the 
defendants would pay the verdict as follows.  The AIP would 
pay $30,000.  The Happy Tap, although only 20% at fault, 
would be jointly and severally liable for the remaining 
damages awarded, or $70,000.224 
3. If the accident causing the plaintiff’s damages and incurring 
defendants’ liability occurred after August 1, 2003, the 
defendants would pay the verdict as follows: the AIP would 
pay $30,000, and the Happy Tap, 20% at fault, would pay no 
more than its allocated share of fault—in this hypothetical 
case, $20,000.225  The plaintiff has $50,000 in damages 
 
 223. As anyone who has practiced in this area can tell the reader, there is no such 
thing as a “typical” Dram Shop case.  The cast of characters and the setting for the case 
all illustrate the maxim that “truth is stranger than fiction.” 
 224. Happy Tap paid $50,000 more than it should have and, after paying the verdict, 
Happy Tap could try to collect the $50,000 from AIP Turnipp.  In most circumstances, 
however, that is not possible because the AIP has no assets and is otherwise judgment-
proof.  Hence, the phrase, “You cannot get blood from a Turnipp.” 
 225. The authors, unwilling to tread on the political minefield left in the wake of the 
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unrecoverable from either party. 226 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Legislature has attempted to remedy the damages 
inflicted on innocent parties by illegal sales of liquor to drunken drivers 
and others by creating the Civil Damages Act and molding it with 
subsequent legislative enactments.  As the preceding analysis 
demonstrates, however, Minnesota’s appellate courts continue to 
valiantly struggle to define the boundaries of the Act.  The legislature, as 
the progenitor of an Act in providing a remedy unavailable at common 
law, bears the ultimate responsibility and remains best-suited to 
addressing ambiguities and problems with the Civil Damages Act. 
 
legislature’s amendment of the comparative fault statute, do not offer any judgment about 
whether the amendment is “fair or unfair,” “good or bad,” etc.  The hypothetical is 
offered merely to illustrate the impact of this amendment on plaintiffs and defendants 
involved in civil claims asserted under the Civil Damages Act. 
  It should be noted that this analysis does not apply in so-called “dead drunk” 
cases, where the AIP dies and his family or other party brings a Dram Shop claim.  Under 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Bushland, the AIP’s comparative fault is not 
imputed to his survivors.  Bushland v. Corner Pocket & Billiard Lounge, Inc., 462 
N.W.2d 615 (Minn. App. 1990).  See also Paulson v. Lapa, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 
App. 1990).   
 226. See supra note 208. 
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